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Public Opinion Toward  
the European Union in Georgia
Martin Müller1
Abstract: Georgia’s association with the EU has become closer in recent years through 
foreign policy instruments including the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern 
Partnership, and the Black Sea Synergy. Against the background of this increasing 
formal cooperation, public opinion toward the European Union in Georgia is exam-
ined on the basis of a nationally representative survey conducted in 2009. Regression 
modeling is used to relate attitudes toward the EU to explanatory factors including 
support  for  continued  European  integration,  expectations  of  beneﬁts  from  European-
ization, political beliefs, perceptions of national security and territorial integrity, and 
attitudes toward Russia.
Mass public protest in the wake of rigged parliamentary elections in Georgia ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze in November 2003 
in what has since become known as the Rose Revolution. In a landslide 
victory, Western-educated Mikheil Saakashvili and his guard of young 
 reformers were swept into power in the ensuing presidential elections at 
the beginning of 2004. This political sea change accelerated Georgia’s ori-
entation toward Europe. During his inaugural address in January 2004, 
Saakashvili had the banner of the European Union raised alongside the 
Georgian  ﬂag  and  declared:
[the  European]  ﬂag  is  Georgia’s  ﬂag  as  well,  as  far  as  it  embodies  
our civilization, our culture, the essence of our history and per-
spective, and our vision for the future of Georgia.… Georgia is 
not just a European country, but one of the most ancient European 
countries.… Our steady course is toward European integration. 
1Assistant Professor for Cultures, Institutions, and Markets at the University of St. Gallen in 
Switzerland. The author would like to thank the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) 
and Hans Gutbrod for providing the dataset and comments on this article.
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It  is  time  Europe  ﬁnally  saw  and  valued  Georgia  and  took  steps  
toward us (Saakashvili, 2004).
The  ﬁrst  of  several  “color”  revolutions  in  the  post-­Soviet  states  paved  
the way for far-reaching reforms strengthening human rights, democracy, 
the rule of law, and the business and investment climate, which made 
Georgia the fastest-reforming country in the world in 2006, according to 
the  World  Bank.  Considered  “no  more  than  a  footnote”  (Freizer,  2004)  in  
the EU’s foreign policy until the early 2000s, Georgia made a big leap in 
formal integration with the European Union through the adoption of the 
 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and the Eastern Partner-
ship  in  2009.  European  leaders  also  played  a  key  role  in  conﬂict  resolution  
in the South Ossetian war and the EU brokered a truce between Georgia 
and  Russia  under  the  French  presidency  (Whitman  and  Wolff,  2010).
Given Georgia’s ever closer formal association with the European 
Union and its strong foreign policy priority of European integration, it 
appears  warranted  to  ask  whether  public  opinion  justiﬁes  this  policy  vec-
tor or whether it is an elite project, pushed by a Western-oriented presi-
dent, which lacks broad public support. Public opinion toward Europe 
and the European Union in Georgia is not well understood, however, pri-
marily due to a lack of data. Georgia is not included in the New Europe 
Barometer and New Russia Barometer surveys of the Centre for the Study 
of Public Policy at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, which repre-
sents the richest source of data available on public opinion toward Europe 
in the post-Soviet space (see, for example, Munro, 2007; Rose and Munro, 
2008). The last comprehensive assessment of public opinion dates back to 
the surveys of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer from 1994 to 1998. 
Since that time the political, social, and economic landscape in Georgia 
has undergone profound changes, the most incisive events being the Rose 
Revolution and the war in South Ossetia in August 2008. The present 
study is based on a representative public opinion poll of the  Georgian 
population in August 2009 and has two aims:
to provide descriptive data about different aspects of the percep-1. 
tion of the European Union in Georgia;
to relate attitudes toward the EU to explanatory factors using a 2. 
logistic regression model.
In so doing, it seeks to provide a much-needed analysis for decision-
making, based on empirical data, that helps understand public opinion 
toward  the  European  Union  in  Georgia  and  can  contribute  to  the  reﬁne-
ment of integration strategies.
COMING CLOSER TO EUROPE:  
GEORGIA AND THE EU
The European Union and Georgia look back onto a history of coopera-
tion starting with Georgia’s independence in 1991 (see Table 1). Initially, 
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EU support concentrated primarily on basic humanitarian assistance and 
food  aid  in  a  country  riven  by  violent  conﬂict:  from  1992  to  1997,  Georgia  
suffered  through  two  separatist  conﬂicts  and  two  brief  civil  wars  (Cornell,  
2001). Toward the end of the 1990s, EU aid shifted to technical cooperation, 
aimed at facilitating Georgia’s economic and social development under 
the TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States) program. In the period from 1992 to 2006, grants from the EU to 
Georgia amounted to EUR 505 million, of which EUR 112 million were 
disbursed under TACIS (European Union External Action, 2010). Only at 
the  end  of  the  1990s,  however,  did  the  ratiﬁcation  of  the  Partnership  and  
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) provide a basic legal framework for wide-
ranging cooperation that sought to advance democratic principles, the 
rule of law, human rights, and a market-oriented economy in Georgia.
Based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the ENP 
was expanded on June 14, 2004 to the countries of the South Caucasus. 
The  ENP  aims  to  share  the  beneﬁts  of  EU  enlargement  in  2004  with  adja-
cent countries and avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
EU and its neighbors (Gänzle, 2009; for critical assessments of the ENP, 
see Browning and Christou, 2010; Kostadinova, 2009; Franke  et  al.,  2010). 
In  order   to   fulﬁll   this  mission,   the  EU  and  Georgia  adopted   the  Action  
Plan and the National Indicative Programme in November 2006, which 
provided the ENP with a concrete agenda (see EU–Georgia Cooperation 
Council, 2006; European Commission, 2006; European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument, 2006). Moving beyond cooperation toward 
integration,   the   National   Indicative   Programme   deﬁnes   priority   areas  
and objectives for the implementation of the Action Plan and is allocated 
a budget of EUR 120 million from 2007 to 2010. The National Indicative 
Programme  marks   the   ﬁrst   time   that   cooperation   between   the   EU   and  
Georgia is embedded in a coherent international framework that speci-
ﬁes  concrete  goals.  The  time  periods  of  four  years,  however,  are  too  short  
to allow progress toward those goals to materialize. Not surprisingly, the 
tentative mid-term review in 2009 noted that an assessment of the impact 
of  the  National  Indicative  Programme  proved  difﬁcult,  since  none  of  the  
projects started in 2007 had been completed (European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument, 2009).
The  ﬁnal  two  pieces  in  the  treaty  mosaic  that  has  come  to  bind  together  
the EU and Georgia in the past years are regional complements to the ENP 
in Eastern Europe: the Black Sea Synergy, launched in April 2007, and the 
Eastern Partnership, launched in May 2009. Through the Black Sea Syn-
ergy the EU seeks to enhance regional cooperation in a number of key 
sectors between countries in the so-called Wider Black Sea region, which 
comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, and 
Ukraine. No additional funds are disbursed under this regional coopera-
tion agreement, which aims at coordinating different regional initiatives 
through so-called sector partnerships in which joint projects are devel-
oped between partners (see Commission of the European Communities, 
2007).
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Table 1. Timeline of Important Events in Georgia’s Relationship with the 
European Union since 1999a
Time Keyword Details 
April 1999 Council of 
Europe
Georgia becomes a member of the Council of Europe
July 1999 Partnership and 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(PCA)
The PCA between the EU and Georgia enters into force, 
establishing the scope for a wide-ranging cooperation 
with the following objectives: 
increasing political dialogue•  
consolidating democracy in Georgia•  
developing a market economy in Georgia•  
promoting trade and investment•  
November 
2003
Rose Revolution Mass protest leads to the annulment of parliamentary 
elections and brings Mikheil Saakashvili to power.
May 2004 European 
Neighbour-
hood Policy 
(ENP)
ENP includes the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors. 
It aims to deepen cooperation between the EU and its 
neighbors and avoid the emergence of dividing lines 
after the 2004 enlargement
November 
2006
Action Plan The Action Plan follows up on the ENP and sets out a 
general agenda for eight priority areas: 
the rule of law, democratic institutions, and human 1. 
rights
business and investment climate2. 
economic and sustainable development and pov-3. 
erty reduction
cooperation  in  the  ﬁelds  of  justice,  freedom,  and  4. 
security
regional cooperation5. 
peaceful  resolution  of  internal  conﬂicts6. 
cooperation on foreign and security policy7. 
transport and energy8. 
November 
2006
European 
Neighbour-
hood and 
Partnership 
Instrument 
(ENPI), 
 National 
Indicative 
Programme 
2007–2010
The  ENPI  is  the  ﬁnancial  instrument  for  implementa-
tion of the Action Plan. Every country has a National 
Indicative  Programme  that  speciﬁes  goals,  indicators,  
and budgets for priority areas on the basis of the 
 Action Plan. Georgia has four priority areas: 
support for democratic development, the rule of 1. 
law, and governance
support for economic development 2. 
support for poverty reduction and social reforms3. 
support for peaceful settlement of Georgia’s inter-4. 
nal  conﬂicts
Total budget for Georgia: EUR 120 million
April 2007 Black Sea 
 Synergy
A regional initiative for coordinated action at the 
 regional level in key sectors such as energy, transport, 
environment, mobility, and security. 
Table continues
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In contrast to the Black Sea Synergy, the Eastern Partnership aims to 
bring  the  participating  countries  closer  to  the  EU,  yet  “without  prejudice  
to individual countries’ aspirations for their future relationship with the 
EU”  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  2008,  p.  2).  The  Eastern  
Partnership started as an initiative of Poland and Sweden and initially met 
with considerable reservations from other EU member states. It was only 
after  the  war  in  South  Ossetia  that  the  project  gained  sufﬁcient  momentum  
and the European Commission received the mandate for its implementa-
tion (Halbach, 2008). With a modest budget allocation of EUR 600 million 
for the period from 2010 to 2013, the program has scaled down its ambi-
tions   considerably   compared   to   earlier   drafts.   For  Georgia,   the   Eastern  
Partnership means additional funds for integration and a renewed com-
mitment  on  the  part  of  the  EU  to  stand  in  for  regional  stability.  In  its  ﬂex-
ible geometry, the Partnership leaves it up to the participating countries 
to choose the pace of association and offers new contractual relations in 
exchange for political and economic reform. This gives Georgia an incen-
tive  for  comprehensive  reform  and  the  ﬂexibility  to  embark  on  a  fast-­track  
path of association with the EU, even though the Eastern Partnership does 
not imply any substantive movement toward EU membership.
This measure of tighter association, however, runs the danger of 
deepening the existing chasm with Russia and fueling tensions in an 
already  difﬁcult  relationship  (see  Lapidus,  2007).   If   the  Eastern  Partner-
ship becomes an alternative to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) in regional integration and a way of establishing an energy transit 
corridor from Central Asia and the Caspian that goes around Russia, Rus-
sia  may  well  interpret  this  as  an  attempt  to  undermine  its  inﬂuence  in  the  
South  Caucasus  (Gogolashvili,  2009;  Sergunin,  2010).  The  Russian  Foreign  
Minister, Sergey Lavrov, thus condemned the Eastern Partnership as a 
return  to  geopolitical  competition:  “We  are  accused  of  having  spheres  of  
Table 1. continued
Time Keyword Details 
August 2008 South Ossetia 
War
Georgia and Russia clash in a military confrontation 
over the status of South Ossetia
May 2009 Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP)
A  speciﬁc  Eastern  dimension  of  the  ENP,  comprising  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine. The EaP allows for a deeper integration 
in the areas of institution building, visa agreements, 
free trade, energy security, and regional develop-
ment. It provides additional funds of EUR 600 
 million from 2010 to 2013. 
aSources: Commission of the European Communities (2007); EU-Georgia Cooperation 
Council (2006); European Commission (2006); European Neighbourhood and Partner-
ship Instrument (2006); European Commission (2009).
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inﬂuence.  But  what  is  the  Eastern  Partnership,  if  not  an  attempt  to  extend  
the  EU‘s  sphere  of  inﬂuence,  including  to  Belarus?”  (Pop,  2009).
The increasing formal association with the EU corresponds to  Georgia’s 
foreign policy strategy: integration into European and Euro-Atlantic 
 security, political, and economic structures is the highest priority on the 
country’s external agenda, with EU membership being the principal long-
term foreign policy goal (Gogolashvili, 2009; Papava and Tokmazishvili, 
2006). In Georgia, unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, which try to balance 
relations with Russia and the EU, both the ruling party and the opposi-
tion are unambiguous about the country’s pro-European choice (Cornell 
and Nilsson, 2009). This agenda has found a fervent supporter in Presi-
dent Saakashvili, who has steered the country closer toward the European 
Union since his election in 2004. Papava and Tokmazishvili state:
[T]he  hope  of  EU  membership  has  been  a  signiﬁcant  catalyst  for  
change in Georgian society. The vision of joining a larger Europe 
without barriers has motivated the government to transform the 
country’s economy and deepen economic and political integra-
tion during the pre-application period (2006, p. 26).
Although the EU does not plan to extend membership perspectives to 
the South Caucasus anytime soon, the new administration implemented 
reforms to work toward meeting the criteria for potential accession 
(Gogolashvili, 2009). It set out to promote economic growth and improve 
the investment climate, root out corruption, build new infrastructure, 
strengthen state power, and align Georgian legislation with European 
principles. These reforms exemplify the soft normative power through 
which the EU has been able to support democratization and civil liberties 
even beyond its borders (Cameron, 2007).
The effect of the war in South Ossetia on public opinion toward the 
EU  also  should  not  be  underestimated.  Occasioned  by  the  war,  EU  For-
eign   Commissioner   Benita   Ferrero-­Waldner   stressed   the   importance   of  
establishing   closer   bonds  with  Europe’s   eastern   neighbors   as   a   “strate-
gic  imperative”  of  EU  foreign  policy  (Cornell  and  Nilsson,  2009;  Halbach,  
2008).  The  conﬂict  enabled  the  EU  to  demonstrate  its  capacity  as  an  inter-
national  political  actor.  For  the  ﬁrst  time,  it  was  not  the  United  States  but  
Europe   that   brokered   a  peace   agreement   for   a   conﬂict   in   the  European  
neighborhood. Even though the blame for the outbreak of the war was 
largely laid on President Saakashvili, the EU was quick to organize a joint 
donor conference and procure aid money to assist Georgia’s recovery. This 
is a marked change from the Union’s earlier, passive role in the territo-
rial  conﬂicts  in  the  South  Caucasus  (Coppieters,  2007;  Halbach,  2007)  and  
has, as one commentator puts it, the potential to raise EU credibility in 
  Georgian  ofﬁcial  and  non-­ofﬁcial  circles.
The EU is now perceived more as a power that is able to [guar-
antee] and interested in guaranteeing democratic freedoms, the 
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sovereign rights of countries, peace and stability (Gogolashvili, 
2009, p. 104).
On the other hand, however, the war in South Ossetia might have 
long-lasting negative impacts on the perception of the EU. In Azerbaijan, 
Valiyev (2009) observes, that the war led to a decline in sympathy for the 
EU and its model of liberal democracy vis-à-vis the Moscow-backed sov-
ereign  democracy.   In  Georgia,   the   conﬂict  had  signiﬁcant   repercussions  
on social and political reforms and dealt a blow to the fragile economy. 
Economic growth became sluggish, and from a growth rate of 12.3 per-
cent in 2007, the country went to 2.3 percent in 2008 and contractd by 
4.0  percent  in  2009  (IMF,  2010).  Despite  Saakashvili’s  announcement  of  a  
“Second  Rose    Revolution”  in  his  address  to  the  United  Nations  General  
Assembly in September 2008, many of the ambitious political reform proj-
ects  were  bogged  down  or  reversed.  Major  deﬁciencies  concerning  media  
freedom, the judicial system, and the transparency of elections remained 
unresolved (Welt, 2009). Widespread dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the Saakashvili administration led to the polarization of domestic poli-
tics and an unprecedented strengthening of opposition forces, culminat-
ing in public protests on April 9, 2009 that pressed for the resignation of 
the president  (Cornell and Nilsson, 2009). Since Georgia’s European orien-
tation is one of the priority projects of Saakashvili and his United National 
Movement party (UNM), public opinion toward the EU may be sensitive 
to the perceived performance of the ruling powers.
MODELING ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EU
While the commitment of the Georgian elites to a European course is 
frequently reiterated, little is known about the orientation of the general 
public toward the EU. Responding to the need for substantive analysis, 
the present study examines Georgian public opinion toward the EU and 
its drivers. It is based on a nationally representative survey, conducted in 
August 2009, which resulted in 1886 full interviews. This section will lay 
out the steps for building a regression model to predict attitudes toward 
the EU in Georgia. The Appendix contains a detailed description of each 
variable for replication purposes as well as details on the survey meth-
odology, data preparation, and analysis. The dependent variable in our 
analysis  was  derived  from  the  survey  question  “What  is  your  general  per-
ception  of  the  EU?”  Respondents  were  able  to  choose  on  a  ﬁve-­point  scale  
ranging  from  1  (=  very  negative)  to  5  (=  very  positive).  For  the  regression  
model, attitude was recoded into a dichotomous variable in which a pro-
European attitude was represented by the two highest points (positive 
and very positive) on the scale. A review of previous studies on attitudes 
toward the European Union in post-socialist countries yielded seven 
sets of explanatory variables as predictors for pro-European attitude. In 
order to isolate the contribution of each set of predictors to explaining a 
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  pro-­European  attitude,  a  regression  model  was  speciﬁed  in  which  sets  of  
predictors were added stepwise (Table 4).
Sociocultural background. Age is commonly found to be the strongest 
predictor of attitudes toward the European Union among sociocultural 
variables, with older people holding a more negative opinion about the 
European Union (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006). Educational achievement, 
on the other hand, is a positive predictor in a number of surveys, where 
higher levels of formal education were associated with more positive atti-
tudes (Caplanova et al., 2004; Munro, 2007; White et al., 2002b). Younger 
and more educated people are generally thought to be better able to reap 
the  beneﬁts  of  open  borders  and  a  single  market  and  therefore  have  a  more  
positive  disposition  (Fligstein,  2008).  The  effect  of  gender  is  less  clear.  In  
some instances, men were found to be more likely to adopt a pro-Euro-
pean stance than women (Tucker et al., 2002; White et al., 2002b), whereas 
White  et  al.  (2008)  ﬁnd,  for  the  case  of  Russia,  that  it  is  women  who  show  
a stronger orientation toward Europe.
Ethnicity tends to be an important factor in states with strong minori-
ties, such as the Russian minorities in the Baltic states, who support 
 European integration less than the titular nations because of their bonds 
to   Russia   (Whiteﬁeld   et   al.,   2006).   In  Georgia,  Azeris   (6.5   percent)   and  
 Armenians (5.7 percent) represent sizable minorities, while 83.8 percent 
of the population is ethnic Georgians (Statistical Yearbook of Georgia, 2007). 
 Ethnicity has become a key determinant of identity for many  Georgians 
and  non-­Georgians  alike,  particularly  in  the  secessionist  conﬂicts  around  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Halbach, 2009) and may therefore be expected 
to  have  an  impact  on  the  view  of  Europe.  Finally,  religion  may  act  as  a  pos-
sible predictor of pro-European attitudes. Spirituality and religion have 
experienced a rebound after the collapse of the Soviet Union and are an 
important factor in everyday life after socialism. This notwithstanding, 
the  powerful   inﬂuence  of   religion  and   religiousness  on  political  prefer-
ences has remained underexplored in analyses of the European orienta-
tion in post-socialist countries (Bruce, 2003).
Economic experience. The economic situation of households has been 
found to be a strong explanatory variable of support for the European 
Union. Higher income and a comfortable economic situation are associ-
ated with a pro-European orientation (Caplanova et al., 2004; Jacobs and 
Pollack,  2006).  This  reﬂects  the  underlying  hypothesis  that  winners  of  the  
post-socialist transformation toward a market economy endorse further 
alignment with Western institutions and a continuation of the reform pro-
cess,  since  this  would  beneﬁt  their  individual  situation.
Knowledge. A lack of information about a certain subject often trans-
lates into suspicion and reservation. It is therefore a common assumption 
in studies of attitudes that a higher level of knowledge is connected to a 
more positive attitude toward a subject. This correlation has been con-
ﬁrmed  for  support  of  EU  membership  and  European  orientation  (White  et  
al., 2002a; White et al., 2008), but has otherwise received little attention in 
comparable studies.
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Political beliefs. There seems to emerge a consensus in the literature on 
support for the European Union in post-socialist states that sociocultural 
and economic variables are poor predictors, when compared to politi-
cal beliefs and value orientations (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006; White et al., 
2008).  Partisan  choice,  as  Rohrschneider  and  Whiteﬁeld  (2006)  claim,  is  a  
neglected area of study in this respect and could reveal much about the 
association of pro-European attitudes with particular political parties. The 
assumption here is that voters take their cues from parties as a shorthand 
guide to structuring complex political decisions about new and remote 
issues (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006). People’s expectation about the nature 
of  government  may  also  inﬂuence  attitudes  toward  the  European  Union.  
Preference for a more paternal style of government with a strong presence 
of state institutions and preference for state intervention—as is common 
in  many  post-­socialist  states—may  conﬂict  with  support  of  the  European  
Union, which embodies a more distant and indirect way of governing 
based on individual freedom. In a similar vein, the general degree of trust 
in institutions may be positively correlated with a pro-European orienta-
tion, since the European Union appears for most people as an abstract insti-
tutional  actor.  In  line  with  other  authors  (see  Munro,  2007;  Whiteﬁeld  et  al.,  
2006), it is also assumed that satisfaction with the state of democracy in the 
country is a predictor of positive attitudes. If people perceive democracy 
to be in good health and working well, support for the European Union, 
which stands in for democratic values and reforms, will be higher.
Cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is a set of predictors that measure 
individuals’ openness and exposure to Europe. A number of studies (Rose 
and  Munro,  2008;  White  et  al.,  2002a)  were  able  to  conﬁrm  that  a    European  
self-­identiﬁcation  and  having  friends  and  relatives  in  the  West  were  posi-
tively associated with a pro-European attitude in Russia. In addition, other 
analyses  have  conﬁrmed  the  positive  effect  of  exposure  to  Europe  through  
journeys or periods of residency for studying or working (White et al., 
2002a;  White  et  al.,  2002b).  Foreign  language  ability  may  be  another  factor  
that contributes to greater openness toward Europe, since it allows interac-
tion with people from European countries, reading foreign- language liter-
ature  or  watching  ﬁlms,  and  following  current  affairs  in  foreign-­  language  
media.  In  some  cases,  urban  residence  had  a  signiﬁcant  positive  effect  on  
attitudes toward Europe (White et al., 2002b; White et al., 2008), although 
other  studies  were  able  to  ﬁnd  this  effect  only  for  large  metropolitan  areas  
and not for smaller cities (Rose and Munro, 2008).
Instrumental gain. A utilitarian position would suggest that a positive 
assessment of gains from closer association with the European Union is 
linked to positive attitudes (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006). In contrast to value 
orientations,  instrumental  gain  refers  to  the  immediate  beneﬁts  and  costs  
associated with European integration, covering such aspects as economic 
growth, price stability, freedom of speech, or independent media. Although 
Rohrschneider   and  Whiteﬁeld   (2006,   p.   147)  maintain   that   value   orien-
tations are of greater importance than instrumental  factors in  assessing 
 attitudes toward the European Union in Eastern Europe, instrumental cal-
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culations have been found to be reliable predictors in Western  European 
countries (e.g., Hooghe and Marks, 2005) and are therefore included in 
this study.
Relations with Russia. In order to account for the special situation in 
Georgia   after   the   conﬂict   in   South  Ossetia,  perception  of   relations  with  
Russia is included as a set of control variables. In particular, the model 
controls for the perception of Russia as a threat and for the perceived 
importance of Russia as Georgia’s most important political partner.
RESULTS
The   perception   of   Europe   is   highly   positive   in   Georgia.   Figure   1  
shows  that  more  than  ﬁve  out  of  10  Georgians  see  themselves  as    culturally  
 European and agree with the statement of the late Prime Minister of 
Fig. 1. Perception of the EU and European identity in Georgia (2009).
74  MARTIN MÜLLER
 Georgia, Zurab Zhvania, in his speech before the Council of Europe in 
1999:  “I  am  Georgian  and  therefore  I  am  European.”  More  than  half  of  the  
respondents in the sample have a positive attitude toward the European 
Union,  while  only  3.6  percent  report  a  negative  attitude.  Almost  four-­ﬁfths  
would vote in favor of EU membership in a hypothetical referendum and 
the majority adopts a highly optimistic outlook on Georgia’s prospects for 
becoming an EU member in the future: close to one-half of the population 
believes that Georgia will become an EU member in 10 years or less.
Fig. 2. Rating of Georgia’s foreign policy priorities (2009).
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Figure  2  demonstrates  that  working  on  a  closer  association  with  the  
EU is seen as paramount for Georgia, with the US and NATO ranking 
slightly lower in priority. Although orientation toward the post-Soviet 
space is considerably less popular, it is important to note that strengthen-
ing ties with Russia is also rated as important, indicating that a unilateral 
association with Europe might not be the avenue favored by the majority 
of the population.
The most pressing issues for the population are not external rela-
tions  with  the  EU,  however,  but   territorial   integrity  and   jobs  (Figure  3).  
EU membership is down on rank 8 of the list and considered by only 12 
percent to be one of the three most important issues facing Georgia at the 
moment. Relations with Russia and NATO membership, in contrast, get 
28 percent and 26 percent of the vote. While the EU enjoys popularity 
and a positive image, it is actors like Russia and NATO that seem to have 
greater  signiﬁcance  for  Georgia’s  current  situation  of  territorial  instability.  
National security and territorial integrity, accordingly, lead the list of areas 
in  which  Georgians  expect   the  most  signiﬁcant   improvements   resulting  
from a potential EU membership (Table 2). Democratic values, such as 
freedom of speech or fairness of elections, and economic development, 
such as an increase in jobs or better pensions, trail somewhat behind. The 
high percentage of respondents indicating that they do not know or refuse 
to answer suggests, however, that expectations from EU membership 
might be based more on hopes and speculations than on sound informa-
tion and knowledge.
Perceptions   of   the   EU   vary   signiﬁcantly   depending   on   how   Geor-
gians rate the state of democracy in their country (Table 3). Those who 
perceive Georgia as performing well on the democracy record also hold 
a  signiﬁcantly  more  positive  opinion  of  the  EU.  They  are  more  likely  to  
characterize the EU as a democratic organization promoting peace and 
Fig. 3. The most important issues facing Georgia at the moment (2009).
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security as well as democratic and economic development abroad. In the 
same vein, they are also less likely to see the EU as a threat to Georgian 
traditions. In general, the EU’s role in supporting democracy, peace, and 
economic development is well recognized. There is some doubt, however, 
whether the EU is willing to accept any European country as a member, as 
stipulated under article 237 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome for the European 
Economic Community.
The  public  proﬁle  of  the  EU  in  helping  to  negotiate  peace  in  the  war  in  
South  Ossetia  is  rather  low.  The  most  important  role  in  ending  the  conﬂict  
is  attributed  not  to  the  EU  but  to  France  as  a  single  actor  (31.8  percent  of  
respondents) and then to the US (23.8 percent). Unlike what happened in 
Azerbaijan (Valiyev, 2009), however, levels of trust even increased follow-
ing  the  conﬂict:  whereas  in  2007  only  20.0  percent  of  the  Georgian  popula-
tion indicated they fully trusted the EU, this percentage went up to 26.4 
percent in 2009 (Caucasus Research Resource Center, 2009).
MODELING A PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE
Next, we built stepwise regression models to isolate predictors for a 
pro-European attitude (Table 4). The initial models yield little explana-
tory value for the standard set of variables relating to sociocultural back-
ground and economic experience (Models 1 and 2). Being male and hav-
ing a higher household expenditure are weakly correlated with a positive 
attitude toward the EU, but the effect disappears for gender as more vari-
ables are included. Adding knowledge about the European Union (Model 
3) as a predictor does not improve the model.
The  most   signiﬁcant   improvement   occurs  with   the   set   of   variables  
reﬂecting   political   beliefs   (Model   4),   increasing   Nagelkerke’s   R2 from 
0.02 to 0.12. All four predictors—party preference, preference for a pater-
nal government style, assessment of the current level of democracy, and 
institutional   trust—enter   the   regression  equation  below   the   signiﬁcance  
threshold. A preference for Mikheil Saakashvili’s party, United National 
Movement, high institutional trust, and a high rating of the current level 
of democracy in Georgia are all associated with a pro-European attitude. 
By contrast, a preference for a paternal style of government is associated 
with a more negative attitude toward the EU.
Among the predictors measuring cosmopolitanism (Model 5), only 
European   self-­identiﬁcation   has   a   signiﬁcant   positive   effect   on   opin-
ion toward the EU. Direct exposure to Europe via residence, travel, or 
 foreign-language knowledge as well as residence in Tbilisi do not show 
signiﬁcant  effects.  The  effect  of  household  expenditure,  however,  declines,  
when adding the cosmopolitanism variables, suggesting that well-off 
population groups have a higher exposure to Europe and, through this 
direct experience, might develop a more positive attitude.
The single predictor with the largest effect is the indicator measuring 
instrumental  gain  through  the  perceived  beneﬁt  of  joining  the  EU  (Model  
6). Instrumental calculations of loss and gain appear to be key factors in 
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adopting a position toward the EU: those who expect little or no gain for 
Georgia  from  a  potential  EU  membership  display  signiﬁcantly  more  nega-
tive  attitudes.  Finally,  controlling  for  relations  with  Russia  reveals  a  weak  
correlation with the position that Russia should be Georgia’s most impor-
tant partner. Advocating close political cooperation has a weak negative 
impact on opinion toward the EU. No effect is found for the perception of 
Russia as a threat.
The   parsimonious   model   includes   seven   signiﬁcant   variables   and  
achieves  a  10.4  percent  reduction  in  error  versus  guessing.  Figure  4  shows  
the effects of the seven predictors on the odds of having a pro-European 
attitude. Household expenditure, a preference for paternal government, 
and considering Russia the most important partner have small to mod-
erate   effects   on   the   dependent   variable.   By   contrast,   perceived   beneﬁts  
from joining the EU, the evaluation of the current level of democracy in 
Georgia, and being a supporter of the ruling party have a relatively large 
impact.  All   signs  of  coefﬁcients  have   the  direction  hypothesized  earlier.  
With a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.20, the proportion of variance explained by our 
model is in the order of other studies on attitudes toward Europe in post-
Soviet countries (e.g., Rose and Munro, 2008; White et al., 2002b).
DISCUSSION
Public Opinion Toward the EU
Georgia is a special case in terms of public opinion toward the 
 European Union. With more than half of the population identifying as 
Fig. 4. Changes  in  the  odds  of  being  pro-­European  per  unit  change  in  signiﬁcant  predictors  
(parsimonious model).
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European and 77 percent in favor of EU membership, the country dwarfs 
all other states in the Eastern Partnership with its Euro-enthusiasm—both 
its neighbors in the South Caucasus (see Svensson and Hon, 2010) and 
Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine in Eastern Europe (see White et al., 2008; 
White et al., 2002b). The war in South Ossetia has only served to reinforce 
the belief that Georgia’s future lies in Europe and not in the post-Soviet 
space, as it seems to have cemented trust in the European Union. The situ-
ation in 2009 presents a marked change compared to the results of the 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer in 1996. Then, 51 percent of Georgians 
believed that the country’s future lay with Russia, whereas only 11 percent 
thought it lay with the European Union. Only 37 percent had a positive 
perception of the EU (now: 50 percent), whereas 10 percent had a negative 
perception (now: 4 percent) (European Commission, 1997).
Although strengthening relations with the EU is considered a top 
priority, in terms of importance for Georgia, the EU ranks behind NATO 
and Russia. Much of this can be attributed to the precarious territorial 
situation. National security and territorial integrity are the primary con-
cerns for Georgians at the moment and NATO and Russia are seen as more 
potent actors with regard to Georgia’s territorial interests than the Euro-
pean Union. While closer association with the EU enjoys high popularity, 
Georgians expect the main effects of a hypothetical membership not in the 
priority areas of the ENP—internal government and economic reforms—
but in ameliorating Georgia’s security predicament. There is, therefore, 
much wishful thinking projected into the partnership with the EU—wish-
ful thinking that exhibits a considerable divergence from what the EU 
expects from this partnership.
Although closer association with the EU is perceived as a means of safe-
guarding Georgia’s territorial integrity vis-à-vis Russia, a positive opinion 
toward the EU does not equal a negative opinion toward  Russia. On the 
contrary, Georgians insist on maintaining a good relationship with the 
neighbor to the north (to compare attitudes toward  Russia across Ukraine, 
see  Barrington  and  Faranda,   2009,  pp.   249–251). This is surprising con-
sidering the antagonism that characterized high-level relations between 
the two countries before, during, and after the war in South Ossetia. The 
general public does not seem to support the black-and-white thinking of 
the ruling elites but, while favoring a general orientation toward Europe, 
would prefer to see good neighborly relations with Russia. On the basis 
of our analysis, the assumption that the relationship with Russia has a 
strong effect on attitudes toward the EU needs to be reviewed: perceiving 
Russia as a threat neither has an intimidating effect and reduces support 
for  Western institutions (see Cornell and Nilsson, 2009) nor pushes public 
opinion even more toward the supposedly safe haven of Europe. Only 
perceiving Russia as the most important international partner of Georgia 
is associated with a slight reduction in the odds of having a pro- European 
orientation. This suggests that the assessment of the role of  Russia is per-
haps  less  signiﬁcant  for  the  attitude  toward  the  EU  than  one  might  assume  
given Russia’s looming presence in  Georgian  politics and that there is little 
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evidence of a pro-Russia/pro-Europe divide in Georgia that would polar-
ize public opinion in a similar way as in Ukraine (Munro, 2007).
Drivers of Public Opinion
What, then, can the drivers of public opinion tell us about the social 
characteristics   of   pro-­European   population   groups   in   Georgia?   A   pro-­
European attitude can be found among those groups who have a house-
hold expenditure above average, support the current regime, have a 
positive assessment of the current level of democracy, and consider 
themselves European. These tend to be people who do not see Russia as 
Georgia’s main external partner and favor a less paternal style of govern-
ment.  The  large  pro-­European  part  of  the  population  expects  beneﬁts  from  
Europeanization that amount to a modernization of the country, resulting 
in a more transparent government, freedom of speech, rule of law, and 
increased opportunities for economic development. This implies that it 
is the self-perceived winners of a closer association who have a positive 
attitude toward the EU, whereas those who stand to lose tend to have a 
more negative attitude.
The above characterization indicates that sociocultural variables 
have little explanatory value for predicting attitudes toward the EU, and 
household  expenditure,   though   signiﬁcant,   is  only  a  weak  predictor.   In  
this, Georgia is different both from other countries in the post-Soviet space 
(e.g., White et al., 2008) and from Western European countries, where age, 
education, occupation, and income act as strong predictors of attitude 
(Fligstein,  2008;  Rohrschneider  and  Whiteﬁeld,  2006).  This  may  be  a  result  
of the highly politicized environment in contemporary Georgia in which 
the  inﬂuence  of  basic  socioeconomic  determinants  is  overruled  by  more  
immediate  political  orientations.  The  empirical  ﬁndings  in  this  article  lend  
support to this hypothesis, given that political beliefs exercise a strong 
inﬂuence  on  attitudes.  Partisan  choice,  a  variable  frequently  neglected  in  
other  studies,  has  a  signiﬁcant  effect  which  remains  even  when  control-
ling for other variables. Cue-taking from political parties therefore seems 
to be very prevalent on top of all other effects.
Despite  the  widespread  cultural  identiﬁcation  with  Europe  among  the  
Georgian population, European identity is not nearly as strong a predictor 
for a pro-European orientation as the expected gains from EU member-
ship. Public opinion toward the EU is therefore more dependent on the 
instrumental  beneﬁts  from  closer  association  than  on  cultural  afﬁnity.  This  
questions the primacy of a cultural explanation, based on the presence or 
absence of a European identity, for predicting a pro-European attitude. 
This cultural explanation enjoys popularity in research on public opinion 
in Western European states, but does not seem to hold in equal measure 
for  Georgia  (Checkel  and  Katzenstein,  2009;  Fligstein,  2008;  Hooghe  and  
Marks, 2005).
In a similar vein, the case of Georgia presents something of an anomaly, 
since conventional wisdom suggests that the expected gains from European 
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integration will be lower for less-developed states and support for a Euro-
pean course in these states will root more in value orientations rather than 
in a utilitarian calculus (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006, p. 97; Rohrschneider and 
Whiteﬁeld,  2006,  p.  155).  The  Georgian  population  believes,  however,  that  
the  country  will  reap  a  considerable  beneﬁt  from  integration  into  Europe.  
Considering the almost excessive expectations associated with European 
integration, it might well be the case that this perception changes as inte-
gration continues to deepen. The movement toward establishing a single 
market stands to fuel concerns with price increases and hasten the expo-
sure of Georgian businesses to European competition. The introduction 
of EU standards is likely to increase production costs and put pressure on 
inefﬁcient  producers  in  protected  industries.  This  applies  in  particular  to  
agriculture and viniculture, which provide employment to more than 50 
percent of the Georgian labor force and produce Georgia’s major export 
products. Since agriculture is the most heavily regulated economic sector 
in the EU, adjustment costs will be considerable and are likely to dampen 
the optimism for people working within affected industries. Similarly, 
groups  beneﬁtting   from  nontransparent  government   structures   are   also  
bound to be opposed to the project of political modernization that comes 
with European integration as it reduces the opportunities of rent-seeking 
and corruption.
The prevalence of an instrumental assessment of potential gains in 
driving the assessment of the European Union makes public opinion more 
directly connected to the perceived performance of integration and less 
intractable than when based on cultural or value orientations. At the same 
time,  however,  it  becomes  more  volatile  in  case  the  perception  of  beneﬁts  
from integration shifts. Similar to what happened in the Eastern  European 
countries prior to their accession in 2004, the positive public opinion 
toward the EU might recoil as European integration progresses and overly 
rosy  expectations  yield  to  reality  (Rohrschneider  and  Whiteﬁeld,  2006).
CONCLUSION: EU-PHORIA
euphoria (u-for´e-ah): a feeling of great happiness or well-being, 
commonly exaggerated and not necessarily well founded (Ameri-
can Heritage Medical Dictionary, 2007).
Georgians are in EUphoria. A vast majority of the population sup-
ports a closer alignment of the country with the EU and would vote in 
favor  of  accession.  President  Saakashvili’s  European  course  ﬁnds  broad  
public support among Georgians, regardless of age, education, ethnicity, 
or  gender.  The  conﬂict  in  South  Ossetia  and  the  subsequent  strengthening  
of  the  domestic  opposition  movement  have  done  little  to  shake  conﬁdence  
in Georgia’s European choice. Georgians continue to show a remarkable 
enthusiasm  for  the  European  Union,  which  should  give  sufﬁcient  popular  
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backing to the necessary reforms for a closer association of Georgia with 
the EU in the framework of the European Neighborhood and Partnership 
Instrument and the Eastern Partnership.
But as with any kind of euphoria, the high hopes placed on the EU 
might turn out to be ill-founded and make for a sober morning after. Since 
the process of alignment with the EU is still in its infancy, Georgians seem 
to see closer association with the EU through rose-colored glasses. Expec-
tations that Georgia will soon become a member of the EU or that the 
EU  might   resolve   the   territorial   conﬂicts   in  Georgia’s   favor   and   restore  
the   country’s   territorial   integrity   are   overly   optimistic   and  not   justiﬁed  
by reality. Moreover, once adjustment costs from European integration 
start to be felt in the population, this could result in a serious backlash. 
The large number of people working in agriculture, viniculture, national 
monopolies, or other protected industries may revise their assessment of 
beneﬁts  from  a  closer  association  with  the  EU.
The analysis in this article demonstrates that the instrumental assess-
ment  of  potential  beneﬁts  from  EU  membership  is  more  important  for  a  
positive attitude than cultural identity. Public opinion is therefore depen-
dent on the performance of integration, and disappointment with the 
beneﬁts  of  Europeanization  may  easily  revert   into  resentment.  Showing  
commitment to the goals of the Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern 
Partnership and delivering on the promises of Europeanization—stability, 
democracy, economic development, infrastructural improvement—is cen-
tral for maintaining support for continued integration. Promoting demo-
cratic reforms may be a particularly effective way of supporting transfor-
mation in Georgia and garnering public approval, since people’s positive 
evaluation of the state of democracy is positively correlated with the per-
ception of the EU. Yet, given the unrealistic expectations from closer asso-
ciation with the European Union, it might prove hard to maintain current 
levels of support in the future.
Finally,  contrary  to  some  expectations,  broad  public  support   for   the  
country’s European orientation does not mean a turn away from Russia. 
This   is  where  public   opinion   exhibits   a   signiﬁcant  divergence   from   the  
position of the government. Georgians would like to see friendly relation-
ships with Russia rather than a prolonged antagonism. This may be sur-
prising considering the recent incursion of Russian armed forces on terri-
tory claimed by Georgia and the resultant political and economic turmoil. 
But centuries of shared history have forged social and economic ties that 
keep binding the two countries together, and these may be too close to be 
severed easily. Georgians seem to have an acute awareness that, despite 
all formal association, the European Union is far and Russia is just around 
the corner. The EU will be doing Georgians a favor if it keeps—as it has 
done  in  the  past—Russia’s  interests  in  the  South  Caucasus  ﬁrmly  in  sight  
as it reaches out eastwards, pursuing a strategy of inclusion and balancing 
rather than of divide and rule.
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Survey Administration
The survey was conducted from August 1 to August 10, 2009 by the 
Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in Tbilisi and resulted in a 
sample of 1,886 full interviews from a total of 2,423 contacts (response rate = 
77.8 percent). The target population of the survey comprises all Georgian-
speaking adult citizens of the Republic of Georgia (excluding Abkhazia 
and  South  Ossetia).  To  draw   the  sample   the  country  was  stratiﬁed   into  
three macro-strata (capital, urban, rural) and subsequently 102 clusters 
were selected throughout the country. Clusters coincided with electoral 
districts. Households were selected by random route sampling and the 
respondent within the household was selected using a Kish table. Inter-
views were conducted face-to-face by trained interviewers in the homes of 
respondents. Non-response arose primarily from not being able to locate 
the selected respondent within the survey timeframe.
Data Preparation and Analysis
For   the  calculation  of  descriptive  statistics   (percentages  and  means)  
weights were applied to adjust for non-response and non-coverage. Apply-
ing weights did not have any impact on descriptive statistics that exceeded 
the margin of error. Details of the weighting process can be obtained from 
the author. Cronbach’s  was used to assess the consistency of democracy 
in Georgia ( = 0.80), institutional trust (  =  0.90),  and  EU  beneﬁt   ( = 
0.87)  as  latent  variables.  For  modeling  attitude  toward  the  EU  a  binomial  
logistic regression model was constructed, since the data did not meet 
the criteria for parallel lines assumption required for ordinal regression. 
For  the  regression,  missing  values  of  the  predictors  were  imputed  using  
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. The analysis consists of seven models, 
entering sets of predictors stepwise, and a parsimonious model contain-
ing  only  variables  with  statistically  signiﬁcant  relationships.  Nagelkerke’s  
pseudo-R2 was used to measure the strength of association between the 
dependent variable and the predictors. Nagelkerke’s R2 is similar to R2 
in Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) but in most cases will tend 
to run somewhat lower (Nagelkerke, 1991). The proportional reduction 
in error represents the improvement in classifying respondents correctly 
that is achieved through the model as compared to pure guessing and is 
another  measure  of  model  adequacy.  Goodness-­of-­ﬁt  is  assessed  through  
the  Hosmer  and  Lemeshow  test  in  which  well-­ﬁtting  models  show  non-­
signiﬁcant  2 values (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).
